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ABSTRACT 
The Turkish Straits include the Çanakkale (Dardanelles) and Istanbul 
(Bosporus) Straits and the Marmara (Marmora) Sea between them. The Turkish 
Straits are the only waterways connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas and to the oceans through the Suez Canal and the Straits of 
Gibraltar. Regulation of passage through the Turkish Straits has caused many 
problems throughout history. 
Since 1936, passage through the Turkish Straits has been governed by 
the Montreux Convention. Following the South Ossetia War in August 2008, the 
Turkish Straits again became problematic when Turkey denied passage to U.S. 
warships seeking to transit the Straits. 
This thesis analyzes three key research questions surrounding use of the 
Straits: Can the Montreux Convention satisfy current requirements? Should the 
Montreux Convention be revised? If modifications in the Montreux Convention 
are necessary, what modifications are appropriate, and how might they affect 
stability in the Black Sea? 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
A strait is a narrow, navigable waterway. As Bing Bing Jia says, 
Geography has offered a definition, namely, "a narrow stretch of 
sea connecting two extensive areas of sea." ... However, the 
expression, "two large bodies of water" may be seen by lawyers as 
having specific implications, involving the division between internal 
waters, the territorial sea, and the high seas, which concepts are 
distinctive in law.1 
As a geographical category, according to Moore, a strait connects 
extensive areas of the sea and is a narrow stretch of sea.2  Bruel, in his classic 
text on international straits, offers four characteristics of a strait.3 To be a strait in 
the geographical sense, the water must be a part of the sea. Second, it must 
have a limited width. Narrowness is an important factor for the international legal 
definition because legally, an international strait is a geographical strait through 
which a high sea corridor does not exist. If a strait is wider than double the extent 
of the territorial sea, it is considered a corridor of the high seas. Nihan Unlu notes 
that such a corridor falls outside the legal concept of an international strait, 
although geographically it serves as a strait through which all ships and aircraft 
enjoy freedom of navigation and over flight.4 Third, a strait must separate two 
land masses, whether two continents, or one continent and an island or two. 
Finally, a strait must connect two areas of sea. 
                                            
1 Bing Bing Jia, The Regime of Straits in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 3. 
2 Wilfred George Moore, A Dictionary of Geography (London: Penguin Press, 1975), 221-
222. 
3 Erik Bruel, "The General Legal Position of International Straits," International Straits, A 
Treatise on International Law, Vol. I., at 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/3016974.pdf  accessed February 2009. 
4 Nihan Unlu, The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 
2002), 17. 
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According to Nihan Unlu, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) fails to adequately address the legal status of straits. The 
UNCLOS describes only the type of regime that should be applied to 
international straits, without describing a strait used for international navigation. 
The relevant articles are Articles 36, 37 and 45.5 
Article 36: This Part does not apply to a strait used for international 
navigation if there exists through the strait a route through the high 
seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience 
with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics, in 
such routes, the other relevant parts of this convention, including 
the provisions regarding the freedoms of navigation and over flight, 
apply. 
Article 37: This section applies to straits, which are used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high sea or an 
exclusive economic zone. 
Article 45: The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with 
Part II, Section 3, shall apply in straits used for international 
navigation: b) between a part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.  
 
Given these articles, Unlu says,  
[T]he Turkish Straits could therefore be considered geographically 
as straits used for international navigation. First, they are narrow, 
because there is not any high sea corridor through the straits; 




                                            
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm  
accessed February 2009. 
6 Unlu, 18. 
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Figure 1.   Turkish Straits System7 
The Turkish Straits include the Çanakkale (Dardanelles) Strait, the 
Istanbul (Bosporus) Strait and the Marmara (Marmora) Sea between them.8 The 
164-mile waterway encompassing these straits is called the Turkish Straits 
system. (Figure 1) The Turkish Straits are the only waterways connecting the 
Black Sea to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas and to the oceans through the 
Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. The Turkish Straits are also the 
boundary between the continents of Europe and Asia.  
Regulation of passage through the Turkish Straits has caused many 
problems throughout history. Since 1936, the Montreux Convention has 
governed passage through the Turkish Straits. Following the South Ossetia War 
in August 2008, the Turkish Straits became problematic when Turkey denied 
some U.S. warships passage through the straits.  This thesis analyzes three 
research questions surrounding the administration of the straits:  
                                            
7 Source: Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service (TSVTS) Official Webpage, at 
http://www.afcan.org/dossiers_techniques/tsvts_gb.html accessed March 2009. 
8 In this thesis, the names for waterways and seas are used as appropriate for the historical 
period under discussion. Bosporus, Dardanelles and Marmora are used in discussions of the 
historical context, and the current names are used in discussing the contemporary period. 
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Can the Montreux Convention satisfy current requirements?9 Should the 
Montreux Convention be revised? If modifications in the Montreux Convention 
are necessary, what modifications are appropriate and how might they affect 
stability in the Black Sea? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
As noted Cemil Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits are politically, economically 
and strategically important, and this importance is the outcome of their 
geographical situation which in turn gives rise to political interests.”10 The 
geographical situation makes the Turkish Straits especially important for 
countries bordering the Black Sea.  
After the Turkish Independence War in 1923, passage through the Turkish 
Straits was regulated by the Lausanne Agreement, which restricted Turkey's 
sovereignty on the straits. Turkey reasserted control over the straits when it 
signed the Montreux Agreement signed on July 20. The Turkish Straits were a 
very sensitive area for possible attacks early in World War II.11 
Global powers have competed for influence over the Turkish Straits and 
the Black Sea for more than three centuries. Although various solutions were 
found for controlling the Turkish Straits, none could satisfy every side.12 
This remains true today. The Turkish Straits are still important, due to 
rapid increases in commercial transport and military activities. Recently, 
                                            
9 Many scholars such as Rozakis and Unlu accept that many rules and definitions of the 
Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, do not fit all the specialties of today such as weapon 
systems or the classification of warships and they claim that the Montreux Convention is 
particularly in regard the need to update naval vessel classifications and to substitute the 
authority of the United Nations for the League of Nations. 
10 Cemil Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian 
Correspondence,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct. 1947), 731, at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193087 accessed December 2008. 
11 Christos L. Rozakis and Petros N. Stagos,  The Turkish Straits  (Dortrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Press, 1987), 44-47.  
12 Antony R. Deluca, Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Conference 
and Convention of 1936, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 5-8. 
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increased tensions in the Caucasus and Black Sea areas have focused attention 
again on the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The Turkish Straits are not international channels; they are water channels 
under the rule of Turkey and open to international use. The Montreux Convention 
clearly states that the Turkish Straits are under the control of the Turkish 
Republic. The international passage regime is identified and defined by the 
Montreux Convention as the “harmless right of passage.”13 This means free 
cruising without causing harm. Harmless passage includes three specific 
elements determined by the Montreux Convention: harmless cruising, obeying 
formalities, and paying taxes, fees and official charges.  
The Turkish Republic has operated with the agreement since 1936. 
Deficiencies in the agreement have emerged over the years, resulting in attempts 
to modify it in part or in whole. 
Recent tensions in the Caucasus create new risks in the region. In light of 
recent developments, this thesis begins by reviewing the history and importance 
of the Turkish Straits and agreements regarding them.  
Second, the thesis examines the Montreux Convention regarding the 
regime of the Turkish Straits, and explains how the Montreux Convention 
regulates passage through the Turkish Straits.  
Finally, the thesis examines recent developments involving the Turkish 
Straits since the South Ossetia War. It discusses the demands of Russia, the 
United States and Turkey regarding the Monteux Convention and the Turkish 
Straits. 
This thesis focuses on the hypothesis that the current situation governing 
the Turkish Straits is the best for all sides (United States, Turkey and Russia) 
                                            
13 Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Hoover Institution Pres, 1972), 
40-41. 
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because since it was signed, the Montreux Convention has provided peace in the 
Black Sea. The thesis also examines how possible modifications to the Montreux 
convention might affect the current situation in the Black Sea. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Mare Liberum 
The Latin term mare liberum means “free sea” or “freedom of the sea.” It 
refers to waters outside of national jurisdiction. The principle of mare liberum was 
proposed by Hugo Grotius in his 1609 book by the same name, today considered 
one of the first works of international law.14  
Grotius was a jurist and philosopher in the Dutch Republic who also 
worked for the Dutch East India Company. At the time, there was no legislation 
pertaining to international waters. Grotius was the first to write about it in the 
predecessor to Mare Liberum, De Iure Praedae Commentarius (The Law of Prize 
and Booty) in 1604-1606.15 
Grotius found the foundations for international law in natural law. In Mare 
Liberum, Grotius formulates the principle that the sea is international territory and 
all nations are free to use it for seafaring trade.16 
Grotius argued that the sea should be free to all, and nobody has the right 
to prevent others from using it. He described his approach: “the Dutch have the 
right to sail to the East Indies” and “to engage in trade with the people there.”17 
                                            
14 Edward N. Zalta, ed., “Hugo Grotius,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ accessed February 2009. 
15 Jeroen Vervliet, “The value of Hugo Grotius’ ‘Mare Liberum’ in today’s world,” at 
http://www.mareliberum.nu/v1/index.php?mnu=2 accessed February 2009. 
16 Hugo Grotius, translated by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, The Freedom of the Seas, or the 
Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian Trade  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1916), vi. at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/552 on 2009-03-03 accessed February 
2009. This edition has a facsimile of the 1633 edition.  
17 According to Vervliet, Grotius, by claiming “free seas,” provided suitable ideological 
justification for the Dutch to break up various trade monopolies through its formidable naval 
power and then establish its own monopoly. 
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He then described a primary rule, or first principle, namely, “Every nation is free 
to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.” From this principle, Grotius 
argued that the right to travel and to trade requires both a right of innocent 
passage over land, and a similar right of innocent passage at sea.18 
According to Grotius, the air belongs to this class of things for two 
reasons. First, it is not susceptible of occupation; and second, its common use is 
destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it 
is so limitless that it cannot become anyone's possession, and because it is 
adapted for the use of all, whether considering navigation or fisheries.19 
However, many of his colleagues did not accept these ideas. The Scottish 
jurist William Welwod argued against mare liberum in An Abridgement of All Sea-
Laws (1613), eliciting a response from Grotius around 1615 under the title 
Defensio capitis quinti Maris Liberi oppugnati a Gulielmo Welwodo (Defense of 
the five free oceans, opposed by William Welwod).20 John Selden, in his book 
Mare Clausum (1635), claimed that “the sea was in practice virtually as capable 
of appropriation as terrestrial territory.”21 
England, in fierce competition with the Dutch to dominate world trade, 
opposed mare liberum, claiming the Dominion of the British Sea. The dispute had 
important economic implications. The Dutch Republic supported the idea of free 
trade, while England adopted the Act of Navigation (1651), forbidding goods from 
entering England except on English ships. The Act led to the First Anglo-Dutch 
War (1652-1654).22 
As the controversy led to conflicting claims, maritime states moderated 
their demands and based their maritime claims on the principle that sovereignty 
                                            
18 Grotius, 7. 
19 Grotius, 28. 
20 Unlu, 21. 




extended seawards from land. A workable formula was found by Cornelius 
Bynkershoek in De Dominio Maris (1702), restricting maritime dominion to the 
cannon range that could effectively protect the land.23 This was universally 
adopted and became the three-mile limit. 
Today, seas are considered joint property of mankind. The mare liberum  
principle became universal and was ultimately transformed into a “freedom of the 
seas” rule. Indeed, freedom of navigation and transit is a form of “freedom of 
seas.” 
2. International Straits and the Turkish Straits 
According to Unlu, “The regime in straits was developed by the writings of 
some of the most important theorists of international law.”24 Grotius was the first 
international law author to study the question of rights of passage through 
territorial waters and straits in his work De Jure Belli ac Pacis.25 Grotius believed 
that states have the right of unarmed passage through straits even though those 
parts of the sea fall under a sovereign state's jurisdiction. He asserted that the 
coastal state should protect and promote navigation through straits by keeping 
the thoroughfares lighted and marked off and by conditioning such passage upon 
payment of a moderate toll.26 In the same century, however, John Selden 
rejected this idea, claiming that “a coastal State could rightfully refuse the 
passage of a foreign vessel.”27 The two writers’ discussion shows that, in the 
seventeenth century, the main issue was the freedom of the seas in general.  
In the eighteenth century, analysts began to distinguish between the 
territorial seas and the high seas. Cornelis Van Bynkershoek, in De Dominio 
Maris (1702), supported the idea that “a State had the right to forbid the unarmed 
                                            
23 Vervliet. 
24 Unlu, 22. 
25 Unlu, 22. 
26 Unlu, 23. 
27 Unlu, 24. 
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passage in territorial waters, including straits, but the passage would in any case 
be made conditional upon payment of moderate dues for keeping the strait 
lighted.”28 Unlike Bynkershoek, Emmerich de Vattel made a distinction between 
straits that “serve for communication between two seas and straits that have no 
such function.”29  According to Vattel, the littoral state had no right to refuse 
passage in straits of the first category but dues might be required for passage. 
Hence, Vattel is considered the first to propose the concept of international 
straits. 
Nineteenth-century authors went a step further, discriminating between 
warships’ and merchant vessels’ passage through straits. Some scholars, 
including Alphonse Rivier, Paul Godey and Erskine Holland, claimed freedom of 
passage for both types of vessel. Others, such as Pasquale Fiore and Henry 
Wheaton, supported free passage only of merchant vessels. According to Fiore 
and Wheaton, “ships could only pass through straits for commercial reasons; 
therefore, the littoral State could prohibit the passage of warships through 
straits.”30 Rivier, Godey and Holland, in contrast, suggested, “[A]ll nations had 
the right of passage through straits provided the passage be inoffensive. In other 
words, States may regulate the passage of ships but not forbid the passage of 
them.”31 The focus of discussion in the nineteenth century was on passage of 
vessels in peacetime. 
The twentieth century saw the final steps concerning straits, passage, and 
discrimination among vessels. Liberal interpretations of the right of passage 
through straits were accepted. Unlu says “According to the majority of the 
authors (Henning Matzen, Karl Gareis, Hannis Taylor, Francis Lawrence 
Oppenheim), passage should be free to both merchant vessels and warships.”32 
                                            
28 Unlu, 22. 
29 Unlu, 22. 
30 Unlu, 23. 
31 Unlu, 23 
32 Unlu, 23. 
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One twentieth-century writer, Walter Schucking, emphasized the 
importance of the term “international strait,” pointing out “not all straits, which 
connect two high seas, are necessarily of interest to international law. Only those 
that are of practical value to international shipping should be subject to a special 
set of rules.”33  
The twentieth century is also when rules of law regarding seas were 
established. Unquestionably, the most important is the UN Convention, 
UNCLOS, which followed a United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
held from 1973 through 1982. The UNCLOS defines the rights and 
responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing 
guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine 
natural resources.  
During the conference, Canada proposed to define a strait as a natural 
passage between land formations that lies within the territorial sea of one or 
more states at any point in its length. The Private Group on Straits defined it as 
any natural stretch of water, whatever its geographical name, which connects two 
parts of the high seas.34 As noted above, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
did not define straits used for international navigation from a geographical 
perspective. 
The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention has been signed and ratified by 157 
countries.35 Within the framework set forth by the Convention, the law provides 
for the expedient passage of all vessels through designated corridors such as  
straits used for international navigation. However, the law also gives coastal 
states the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for 
the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution in ice-covered areas 
                                            
33 Unlu, 23. 
34 Unlu, 18 
35 As of March 2009. 
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within the limits of the exclusive economic zone. The exclusive economic zone 
comprises areas of the sea, seabed, and subsoil within 200 miles of the shore.36 
The United Nations Law of the Seas Convention expanded territorial seas 
from three to twelve miles. However, the situation of straits was not explained. 
For instance, the Strait of Gibraltar, the only water passage between the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, is only nine miles wide in some places. The 
waters in this strait can be defined as part of both Morocco’s and Spain’s 
territorial seas.  
On this point, Mangone, an internationally known expert on admiralty law 
and marine policy, says, 
A number of international waterways would have been subject to 
the coastal states, affecting more than shipping. You can't fly over 
waters that belong to a nation without its permission, and 
submarines cannot sail under its seas.37 
Given the importance of this question and the lack of detailed scholarly work on 
the world's major straits, Mangone organized and edited a series of fourteen 
books on the physical, economic and legal status of straits.38 Two deal with the 
Turkish Straits: The Turkish Straits (1987) by C. L. Rozakis and Petros N. 
Stagos, and Unlu's 2002 The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits. 
The first three chapters of The Turkish Straits, written by Petros Stagos, 
refer to the political and economic dimensions; the remaining chapters, by 
Christos Rozakis, cover the legal aspects. Stagos notes that the status of the 
“Dardanelles and the Bosporus has been the most significant aspect of the so-
called Eastern Question.”39 The Turkish Straits occupy a “unique geographical 
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position” because they divide two continents, Europe and Asia, and unite two 
seas, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.40 
Stagos gives a deep historical examination of the Turkish Straits, 
emphasizing Russia's systematic efforts to secure free passage by agreements 
with the Ottoman Empire and political intrigues involving the great Western 
powers, including Britain, Austro-Hungary, Prussia, France and later the United 
States, Italy and Greece. 
He also emphasizes the disparities in the stances taken by the great 
powers in different centuries. For instance, he says,  
[A]t the first modern multilateral conference on the straits at 
Lausanne in 1922, there was the irony of the antithetical stances of 
Britain, which had opposed the opening of the straits to warships in 
the nineteenth century, now defending the principle of absolutely 
free navigation, and Russia, which had rejected the perennial 
Tsarist ambition of free naval exit into the Mediterranean, now 
advocating the closure of the straits to warships.41 
Rozakis considers political and legal aspects of the Turkish Straits, as well 
as aspects of the wider seas at both ends, the Black Sea and the Aegean. 
The Lausanne Convention of 1923 provided a special regime and free 
navigation for the Turkish Straits, demilitarized the area, established a special 
Straits Commission and most importantly allowed passage of foreign war 
vessels. According to Rozakis, this convention is a turning point. Previously only 
two basic rules were routinely recognized by the great powers and the Ottoman 
Empire, namely, freedom of passage for merchant ships and closure to warships 
in time of peace.42 
In the mid-1930s, Turkey became increasingly worried about its security 
position under the 1923 regime, and successfully gathered the great powers for a 
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conference in Montreux. The conference concluded with the Montreux 
Convention's restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the straits.  Rozakis 
describes the Montreux Convention as  
... bearing no resemblance to the “unequal treaties” forced on 
States in earlier centuries because of the Straits State's beneficial 
treatment; and it is said to be noteworthy because for the first time 
in the history of the regulation of straits, freedom of navigation was 
proclaimed to be a principle of international law. 43 
After a detailed examination of the Montreux Convention, he says,  
The obsolescence of the Montreux Convention and its inability to 
meet contemporary requirements is obvious. Not only are the rules 
that concern the quantitative and qualitative criteria of warships out 
of date, but the safe transit of merchant ships through the straits 
and the avoidance of pollution of the area were never addressed in 
the convention. 44 
Rozakis concludes, “if the Monteux Convention is not adapted to current 
conditions by a revision, sooner or later it will either become a dead letter or 
merely comprise a few weak directives.”45 
The second book on the Turkish Straits from the International Straits of 
the World series is Nihan Ünlü's The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits.46 Unlu 
begins with the legal status of the Turkish Straits.  
To understand the legal status of the Turkish Straits, it is important 
to find out whether they are straits used for international navigation. 
If straits are not “international,” no legal dispute arises over the 
relation between the right of passage and coastal jurisdiction.47 
Upon investigation, she concludes, “The best way to describe the status of 
water in the Turkish Straits is to consider them as territorial waters,” while noting, 
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“[I]t does not really matter whether the Turkey describes the waters of the straits 
as territorial waters, because the straits are regulated by the Montreux 
Convention.”48 Hence, because of the application of the Montreux Convention’s 
provision, the Turkish Straits cannot be regulated by the internal water regime or 
any new regime provided by Turkey.  
Unlu also explores the possibility of making the straits a particularly 
sensitive sea area, allowing the coastal state to take expanded jurisdiction to 
prevent marine pollution. In concluding her study, Unlu raises key international 
policy questions:  
[S]hould the 1936 Montreux Convention be amended or 
denounced—or changed by some unilateral act of Turkey? Can the 
convention be sustained as it is, modified by unilateral action, 
denounced by the parties, or its provisions changed in some other 
way by international action?49 
Unlike Rozakis, Unlu claims that “Neither Turkey nor the signatory powers 
seem to have any interest in revising the Montreux Convention at present”50 and 
concludes, “Any change could cause unwanted results. None of the states 
appear to be thinking of changing the convention.”51 She clearly does not support 
denunciation of the Montreux Convention, suggesting that  
Turkey should ... fill any gaps in the convention by applying national 
rules that are consistent with contemporary international law but not 
to the extent that it would cause a denunciation of the Montreux 
Convention itself.52 
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3. The Straits Question 
“The Straits question,” “the question of Straits” and “the problem of Straits” 
all refer international disputes over restrictions on the passage of warships 
through the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, the strategic 
straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. The 
historical core of this question is Russian naval access to the Mediterranean from 
the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
According to scholars such as Shotwell, the Straits question existed during 
the ancient, medieval, and modern historical periods. He says the problem of the 
Straits is “one of the oldest and most persistent problems in European history.” 
Whether the West realizes it or not,  
[T]o at least half of Europe there is no other single international 
problem of greater importance than the control of the few short 
miles of waterway that connects the Black Sea with the 
Mediterranean, those narrow Straits which separate Europe from 
Asia.53 
It is true that the Turkish Straits have always had strategic importance in 
history. However, the term “Straits question” in discussions between Turkish and 
European diplomats only appears with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, 
for three centuries, from the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 to the Kucuk 
Kaynarca Agreement in 1774, the Black Sea was a Turkish lake, the problem of 
the Straits did not exist, and the Ottoman Empire established the rule excluding 
all foreign ships from the Black Sea.54 
The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca put an end to the Russia-Turkish War and 
forced Turkey to recognize the independence of the Crimea. The Crimea then 
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became a Russian protectorate and within a few years was annexed to Russia. 
Russia thereby established itself as a major Black Sea power.55 
As a result of Article XI of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, the Black Sea 
was opened to trade and Russia obtained the right of free passage through the 
Straits for its merchant vessels.56 Thus, the year 1774 can be considered the 
beginning of the "question of the Straits." 
Esmer writes, “The question of the Straits has been the basis of Turkey's 
relations with the Powers for almost two centuries.”57 The Straits question has 
persisted in a variety of ways described in Chapter II of this thesis.   
4. Russia and the Turkish Straits 
Unlu classifies Russian policy regarding the Turkish Straits into three 
periods: the seventeenth through eighteenth centuries, the nineteenth century, 
and the twentieth century.58    
a. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries  
During the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire controlled the 
northern shores of the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, preventing 
Russian access to the high seas. Since the Black Sea was a Turkish lake and 
the Baltic Sea was almost useless for many months each year, Tsarist Russia 
had no a free outlet to warm seas. 59 This unfavorable situation for Russia led to 
a series of Russian-Turkish wars that continued until the Turks were completely 
defeated south of the Danube River.60 
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The 1774 treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca recognizing Russia as a Black 
Sea power and giving Russian merchant vessels the privilege of passing through 
the straits was the most important agreement in the area. However, it did not 
satisfy Russia and led, in 1789, to renewed wars against Turkey. This time, 
Russia's insatiability provoked intervention by other powers, including England 
and Prussia. The treaty of Jassy in 1792 reconfirmed the Russian passage rights 
outlined in the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty.61 England’s interest in the Turkish Straits 
began with this treaty.62 
b. Nineteenth Century  
The 1800's saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks 
revolted first, in 1821, with Russian help. After the Ottoman Empire’s defeat, the 
Treaty of Adrianople (1829) was signed. Turkey not only recognized the 
independence of Greece but also gave Russian commercial vessels freedom to 
travel without being searched in all Turkish waters.63 
Russia gained a commercial outlet to the high seas, but from a 
military standpoint, the straits remained a point of weakness. Free access 
through the straits would allow naval powers to attack Russia's southern shores. 
For this reason, passage through the straits was a major issue for Russia.64 
After gaining free navigation for its commercial vessels, Russia 
attempted to have the straits closed to all other powers. This would have 
protected Russia from the British naval threat and would have allowed its own 
fleet to attack British ships in the Mediterranean Sea.65 
A revolt helped Russia's cause. Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, 
revolted against the Ottoman Empire and invaded Syria and Anatolia. Russia’s 
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help was accepted reluctantly. A Russian force landed at Hunkar Iskelesi. After 
the war, Russia did not withdraw its troops from the Bosphorus until the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833.66 With this treaty, Russia won all its demands regarding 
the Turkish Straits. According to a secret article of the treaty, the Ottomans would 
open the straits to Russian warships while keeping them closed to warships of 
other powers.67 This was the first time the Turkish sultan abandoned the "ancient 
rule" of keeping the straits closed to all warships. The reaction in England and 
France was so strong that the Tsar realized he could not maintain the provision. 
The second revolt by Ali Pasha gave another the opportunity for 
change. This time, it was Great Britain’s turn. After the revolt was defeated with 
Great Britain's help, a conference was held in London in 1841 that abolished the 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi. The straits were closed once again to foreign 
warships. Thanks to this convention, an “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" 
was translated into an international concern. 68 
The last half of nineteenth century saw two more conventions on 
the straits, the 1856 Treaty of Paris and the 1871 Convention of London. The 
basic rule laid down in 1841 with regard to closing the straits to the passage of 
foreign warships remained unchanged. The regime of the straits accepted by 
these conventions remained in force until World War I. 69 
c. Twentieth Century  
After the adoption of the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union 
strongly desired co-sovereignty in the area to give it equal power with Turkey in 
the straits.70 At the end of 1936, the Soviets proposed that the Turkish 
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government sign a bilateral defense pact. Turkey refused the proposal, although 
discussions continued until Turkey decided to remain neutral in World War II.  
In a surprise move, the Soviet Union abolished the twenty year old 
Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Russia and Turkey in March 1945, 
claiming the eastern provinces of Turkey and asking for bases on the Turkish 
Straits. 71 The Soviets said that conditions had changed radically and that a new 
treaty more in conformity with the altered situation should be negotiated. They 
wanted to alter the regime of the Turkish Straits to secure "effective guarantees," 
and to annex the eastern provinces of Turkey on August 7, 1946. 72 When the 
three Great Powers met in Potsdam in the summer of 1945, the Soviets had 
raised this question of revising the Straits Convention. 
The Soviet Union put forward the following proposals:  
1. The Straits should be open to merchantmen of all nations in time of 
peace or war. 
2. The Straits should be open in all circumstances to war vessels of the 
Black Sea Powers. 
3. Except in special cases, the passage of war vessels belonging to non-
Black Sea Powers should be forbidden.  
4. The power to formulate the regime of the Straits should be left to Turkey 
and the Black Sea Powers.  
5. The Straits should be defended by the “common means” of Turkey and 
the Soviet Union.73 
The Turkish government found the first three points acceptable as a 
basis for discussion, these being, in fact, similar to the first three points in an 
American note that had been presented in 1945. The fourth and fifth points, 
however, were rejected. Turkey pointed out that the Montreux Conference was 
valid until 1956. 74 
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Great Britain and the United States also had a forceful reaction to 
Soviet demands. Both agreed with Turkey, declaring they would not allow 
exclusive rights for the Soviet Union. With this support, the Turkish government 
declared that the principle of free passage through the Straits was limited by the 
right of the riparian state to the security and defense of its territory.75 Moreover, 
Turkey had the right to defend itself against all aggression, which is the most 
essential attribute of sovereignty. 76 Turkey's acceptance of a joint defense of the 
Straits would be the equivalent of sharing its sovereignty with a foreign power. 
The Soviet Union realized that it could not achieve its aim by diplomacy.77 
In the following decades, the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the West deteriorated. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1951. Initially, the Straits was not a major consideration for either 
NATO or the Soviet Union because NATO was focused on preventing Soviet 
attacks against Europe and the Soviet Union did not have a powerful naval 
force.78 
It was during the 1960s that the Soviet Union began to strengthen 
its navy. In the Six Days War between Egypt and Israel, Soviet warships passed 
through the Turkish Straits. Turkey did not hinder their passage because it was in 
accordance with the Montreux Convention. In the latter months of 1967, Soviet 
ships passed through the Straits with great frequency, totaling more than 124 by 
the end of the year and continuing at about the same rate in 1968.79 
The situation changed when the Soviet Union apparently attained 
strategic equality with the United States, strengthening its fleet with helicopters.  
In 1976, the aircraft carrier Kiev gave the Soviets the capacity to threaten the 
naval hegemony of the United States in the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish 
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Straits therefore became especially important in the 1980s to the strategic 
interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union.80 The situation 
continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the strategic importance of 
the Turkish Straits diminished for the Western powers. 
Today, for the Russian Federation, the Turkish Straits are still 
strategically, economically and militarily important. For example, the oil 
transferred through pipelines through the port of Novorossisk to the Black Sea is 
shipped to the West in tankers through the Turkish Straits. However, the Turkish 
Straits cannot accommodate much more traffic than they already handle. 
Because of the transportation of oil, the Turkish Straits remain important for 
various financial institutions, private companies and governments, especially 
Georgia and Russia. Although the military importance of the Turkish Straits may 
have diminished, they are still vital economically. 81 
5. The United States and the Turkish Straits 
a. The General Policy of the United States Regarding 
International Waters 
Freedom of the seas was among U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points proposed during World War I.82 He stressed freedom to navigate 
the oceans and disapproved of war fought on water. As Wilson said in a speech 
to Congress, U.S. allies Britain and France were opposed to this point, as both 
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were considerable naval powers. Like Wilson's other points, freedom of the seas 
was rejected by the German government.83 
Writing of those times, Harry N. Howard says, “[T]he stand taken 
has been almost entirely a matter of principle, for the [Turkish] Straits have never 
played a great role in American commerce and shipping.”84 Howard classifies the 
U.S. policy regarding the Turkish Straits into three eras:  Pre-World War I, from 
World War I to World War II, and U. S. policy since the outbreak of World  
War II.85 
b. United States Policy Prior to World War I 
U.S.-Turkey relations in respect to the Turkish Straits begin in the 
early nineteenth century. The American-Turkish Treaty of May 7, 1830 gave 
American commercial vessels freedom of passage but made no mention of the 
right of passage for warships. These principles were reaffirmed in the American-
Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of February 25, 1862.86 
The problem of the passage of American warships through the 
Turkish Straits first arose in 1858. The United States sent a light warship for 
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legation service to Constantinople, but was obligated to withdraw because  
of British, French, and Russian protests.87 
At the conclusion of the Convention of London, March 13, 1871, 
which provided for closure of the Turkish Straits to warships, U.S. Secretary of 
State Hamilton Fish declared,  
The United States, not having been a party to the Treaty of Paris, 
may have more or less reason to complain of any curtailment of 
their rights under the law of nations which it may have affected. No 
formal complaint on the subject, however, has yet been addressed 
to either of the parties to that instrument, though the restriction 
which it imposes on the right of our men-of-war to the passage of 
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus is under serious consideration. 
88 
Two years later, Fish reasserted the American policy:  
The abstract right of the Turkish Government to obstruct the 
navigation of the Dardanelles even to vessels of war in time of 
peace is a serious question. The right, however, has for a long time 
been claimed and has been sanctioned by treaties between Turkey 
and certain European states. A proper occasion may arise for us to 
dispute the applicability of the claim to United States men-of-war. 
Meanwhile it is deemed expedient to acquiesce in the exclusion.89 
During this period, many American requests for warships to enter 
the Straits were denied because the United States was not a party to the 1856 
Treaty of Paris, which gave signatories the right to have war vessels permanently 
stationed at Constantinople to serve their legations.90 
c. United States Policy from World War I to World War II 
The problem of the Straits became a significant point of American 
policy with the entry of the United States into World War I. At a 
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conference held at the White House on April 30, 1917, President 
Wilson, Arthur James Balfour, and Colonel E. M. House discussed 
the problem of the post-war internationalization of the region of 
Constantinople and the Straits.91   
In his Fourteen Points early the next year, President Wilson 
declared, “the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to 
the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”92 
In a July 31,1918 draft memorandum based on Wilson's twelfth 
point, David Hunter Miller pointed to three elements of the Turkish problem. The 
first is to secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire; the 
second, to assure security of life and opportunity for the non-Turkish portions of 
the Empire; and the third, to guarantee free passage of the Straits for ships of 
commerce of all nations under international guarantees.93 
Miller continued,  
If international guarantees of freedom of the Straits are to be 
effective, international control of those waters is essential and 
further, international control of the adjacent shores. If Turkish 
sovereignty in any form, nominal, or otherwise, is to continue over 
these waters and lands, or any part of them, it will necessarily be 
limited by and subject to such international control. That such 
international control may be effective and workable has been 
shown by the history of the Danube Commission, an institution 
whose constitution and functions may well serve as a basis for the 
foundation of international control of the Straits.94 
After World War I, in the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23, the 
United States was not officially represented but American demands were read.  
It is of distinct interest to this Government . . . to obtain effective 
assurances that the Straits would be open in time of peace for both 
merchant ships and ships of war to proceed to Constantinople and 
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through the Black Sea. This Sea is a highway of commerce and 
should not be under the exclusive control of Turkey and of 
Russia.95 
Richard Washburn Child, head of the American delegation at the 
Lausanne Conference, summarized the American position concerning the Straits 
on December 6, 1923. 
Our position is based upon that policy of our Government, which 
stands for complete and constant freedom, without special 
privilege, for our commerce and for the commerce of other nations. 
. . . We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce in 
the Black Sea is the exclusive affair of the States bordering upon 
it...96 
The United States did not sign the Lausanne Convention of the 
Straits, but signed a separate treaty with Turkey in August 6, 1923. According to 
Article X of this treaty, 
The commercial vessels and aircraft and the war vessels and 
aircraft of the United States of America shall enjoy complete liberty 
of navigation and passage in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea 
of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, on a basis of equality with similar 
vessels and aircraft of the most favored foreign nation upon 
conforming to the rules relative to such navigation and passage 
established by the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne, July 24, 
1923.97 
The United States was not represented at the Montreux 
Conference, either. The American government, however, accepted the Montreux 
Convention reaffirming the principle of freedom of transit and navigation in the 
Turkish Straits for commercial vessels, although with some restrictions regarding 
war vessels. In the following years, U.S.-Turkey relations concerning the Turkish 
Straits continued on a satisfactory basis. 
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d. United States Policy since the Outbreak of World War II 
At the start of World War II, President Roosevelt emphasized the 
significance of Turkey to the United States, declaring in late I941 that he “found 
the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States.”98 
At the end of the war, during the Potsdam Conference, Truman 
claimed that one of the persistent causes for wars in Europe during the last two 
centuries was “the selfish control of the waterways of Europe.” He implied that 
the waterways in question include the Danube and Rhine Rivers, the Kiel Canal 
and the Turkish Straits. Truman accordingly proposed “free and unrestricted 
navigation” of these waterways, with regulation of navigation by “international 
authorities.”99 Following the Potsdam Conference, the United States sent a note 
to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945, calling for a conference and 
suggesting revision of the Montreux Convention. The note included the following 
points:  
1. The Straits to be open to the commercial vessels of all nations at 
all times;  
2. The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of the Black 
Sea Powers at all times;  
3. Except for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage 
through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea 
Powers at all times except with the specific consent of the Black 
Sea Powers, or except when acting under the authority of the 
United Nations;  
4. Certain changes to modernize the Montreux system, such as the 
substitution of the United Nations Organization for that of the 
League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.100 
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The Turkish government accepted the American note and said it 
was ready to participate in an international conference and accept any 
international decisions regarding the Turkish Straits provided “Turkish 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” were not infringed.101 
On August 7, 1946, the Soviet government sent another note to the 
Turkish government containing more articles unacceptable to Turkey, as 
described above. Actually, the first three of the Soviet principles were in general 
accord with the first three principles of the American note. However, the last two 
points, suggesting the establishment of a new regime on the Straits by the Black 
Sea powers and the development of a joint system of defense with Russia, were 
not acceptable. 
After the Turkish government rejected the Soviet proposals, the 
United States modified its views in a note of October 9, reiterating its earlier 
position and emphasizing that the Potsdam Agreement contemplated only an 
exchange of views with Turkey as a useful preliminary to a conference of all the 
interested powers, including the United States. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This study analyzes the role and future of the Montreux Convention and 
examines the importance of the Turkish Straits. It includes a review of the history 
of the Turkish Straits and agreements regarding them. The basic cornerstones in 
the relationship among the United States, Russia and Turkey, which are 
important in terms of understanding today’s situation, are taken into account.  
The potential effects of modifications in the Montreux Convention on Black 
Sea nations and the United States are examined in an analysis of potential 
advantages and drawbacks. The potential effects on Turkey are addressed in the 
same manner. The thesis concludes with an assessment of these potential 
outcomes. 
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This study relies upon data obtained through secondary sources such as 
books, articles, and reports, including some from sources not available in 
English. Primary sources include bilateral and multilateral agreements, official 
press releases and statements such as the text of the Montreux Convention and 
declarations of NATO, the United States, Russia and Turkey.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter discusses the 
purpose of the thesis as well as the importance of the thesis topic, and offers a 
literature review. The second chapter presents a review of the historical 
background of Turkish Straits. The third and fourth chapters examine the 
Montreux Convention and recent developments concerning the Turkish Straits 
since the South Ossetia war. The fifth chapter offers possible proposals for 
modifying the Montreux Convention and discusses their pros and cons for 
Turkey, the United States, Russia and other nations that have a Black Sea 
coastline. The sixth chapter offers conclusions. 
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TURKISH 
STRAITS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The economic, military and political aspects of the Turkish Straits have 
always been on the global agenda, attracting the attention of the great powers, 
especially Russia.102 Because of its geopolitical position, the Turkish Straits 
continue to have strategic, economic and political importance. 
Historically, various contractual arrangements and diplomatic instruments 
have been used to control passage through the straits. An important maritime 
trade route between the European and Asian continents, the Straits came under 
Turkish sovereignty in 1453 with the conquest of Istanbul. Both banks of the 
Dardanelles had been in Turkish hands before the conquest of Istanbul and 
Turks crossed into Europe via the Dardanelles. According to Hasan Kanbolat, 
after the conquest of Istanbul, the development of the Turkish Straits regime can 
be classified into three periods:  the era of Turkish domination (1453-1809), the 
bilateral agreements era (1809-1841) and the multilateral agreements era (1841-
2009).103 
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Table 1.   Historical Timeline Regarding the Turkish Straits 
 
B. THE ERA OF TURKISH DOMINATION (1453-1809) 
In this period, passage through the straits was subject to the orders given 
by the Ottoman Sultan. The Ottoman Empire was the only authority to determine 
the passage regime and restrict foreign vessels’ passage through the Turkish 
Straits. In the course of time, the Black Sea was defined as a Turkish lake, and 
the Ottomans gained full domination over the straits, closing them to foreign  
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vessels. This general rule, strictly observed during the rise of the Ottoman state, 
began to lose effect with the decline of the Ottoman state in the eighteenth 
century.104 
After the Karlofca Peace Agreement in 1699, Russia began to develop a 
navy, changing the status quo in the Black Sea. European states also became 
involved in the Straits issue between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, making 
the Straits subject to the consent of more than one state.105  Over time, the right 
to free passage through the Straits and to trade in Turkish ports was granted to 
vessels under British, French and Dutch flags. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, 
signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1774, gave Russia 
entitlements to have commercial vessels in the Black Sea, engage in trade and 
pass its trade vessels through the Straits.106 
The Straits were closed to war vessels of third states under the Ottoman-
Russian alliance agreements signed in 1798 and 1805, whereas Russian 
warships were allowed passage. However, the 1805 agreement was terminated 
when a war broke out between these two countries in 1807. The passage of 
foreign warships without a decree by the sultan was forbidden under the 
agreement signed between the Ottoman state and England in 1809.107 
C. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ERA (1809-1841) 
The dominance of Ottoman Empire over the Straits continued in this 
period. Some states acquired free passage rights. There were no issues related 
to the Straits when the Ottoman Empire dominated them, the Black Sea and the 
Marmara Sea. When Russia began to rule the northern shores of the Black Sea, 
the Ottoman Empire recognized the free passage right of Russian trade vessels. 
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After Ottoman-Russia Treaties signed 1798 and 1805, the Black Sea was 
closed to all other countries’ warships. Free passage through the Straits was 
granted for Russian warships and joint defense of the Straits was accepted, so if 
foreign warships tried to enter the Straits forcibly, the Ottoman-Russian fleet 
would resist together. This treaty did not last long, because of the Ottoman-
Russia war in 1807. 108 
The Straits question dates from 1774 when Russia won commercial 
access to the Straits, a right later extended to other powers. The waterway 
remained closed to warships in accordance with the “ancient rule” of the Ottoman 
Empire, of which England became a guarantor in 1809.  The struggle for control 
of the Straits was primarily between Russia and England. According to Esmer, 
“Russia wanted them open to her warships alone, while England wished them 
closed to all warships and open only to commerce.”109  
In 1829, the Edirne Treaty was signed and Russia acquired the right of 
passage for commercial vessels again. The Ottoman Empire also opened the 
Straits for commercial vessels of all states not at war with her. Under the Hunkar 
Iskelesi Treaty signed in 1833, in return for support given for the Egypt problem, 
Sultan Mahmud II favored Russia by closing the Straits to foreign warships. 110 
This agreement lasted until the London Treaty for Straits signed of 1841. 
This time, the Straits were closed to any warship other than Ottoman warships in 
peacetime. Notwithstanding this rule, Britain and France, allies of the Ottoman 
Empire during the Crimean War, sent their fleets through the Straits to attack 
Russia. 111 
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D. THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ERA (1841- 2009) 
The Ottoman Empire, Austria, France, Britain, Russia and Prussia 
participated in the London Conference in 1841, which focused solely on the 
Straits. According to the treaty, the passage through the Straits was removed 
from Ottoman jurisdiction and the agreements signed by the Ottoman Empire. A 
new era, ending the tradition of bilateral agreements, began with the London 
Straits Convention signed on July 13, 1841. For the first time, the Turkish Straits 
and the Black Sea were regulated by a multilateral agreement.112 An 
international regime was established.  
After the Crimean War (1854-1856), the Black Sea was demilitarized by 
the Declaration of Paris, signed in 1856 by the Ottoman state, Russia, Great 
Britain, France, Sardinia, Austria and Prussia. The agreement forbade the 
passage of military vessels of all states, including the Ottoman Empire. 113 
On March 13, 1871, the London Straits Agreement on the Black Sea was 
signed. Under the agreement, the neutrality of the Black Sea was lifted and it 
was agreed that the Ottoman state's allies would be allowed to sail war vessels 
through the Straits even in peacetime, subject to permission by the Ottoman 
sultan. With the agreement, the Ottoman state got rid of most restrictions 
imposed by the 1841 and 1856 agreements. 114 
After the Turkish Independence War, the Lausanne Agreement was 
signed on July 24, 1923. The passage regime through the Turkish Straits was 
regulated by the Lausanne Straits Agreement, as a supplement to the Lausanne 
Agreement under Article 23. The Straits were opened to commercial vessels and 
demilitarized; seizure of foreign war vessels entering the Black Sea in peacetime 
was limited.115 The fundamental principles of the Lausanne Straits Agreement 
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are demilitarization of the Straits zone and establishment of a Straits 
commission, because the Ottoman state was allowed under the London 
Agreement to open the straits for war vessels of ally countries when necessary 
for its own security. 116 
At the 1933 London Disarmament Conference, Turkey first called for 
modification of the status of the Straits regime, because it included provisions 
constraining her sovereignty. The Montreux Conference, attended by all states 
party to the London Convention on Straits except Italy,117 authorized Turkey to 
fortify the Straits and restricted passage of warships that belong to states that do 
not border the Black Sea. The convention, today considered a cornerstone of 
Turkey’s sovereignty, was signed on July 20, 1936. 
                                            
116 Rozakis and Stagos, 93-99. 
117 Deluca, 53. 
 35
III. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION REGARDING THE REGIME 
OF THE TURKISH STRAITS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Montreux Convention Regarding the Turkish Straits between 
Australia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Romania, the dissolved 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia, 
which regulates the legal status of the Canakkale Strait, the Marmara Sea and 
the Istanbul Strait, was executed on July, 20, 1936 and came into force on 
November 9, 1936. The Convention was kept open to any state which signed the 
Lausanne Peace Convention. Italy benefited from this right and participated in 
the Convention, while Japan waived all rights and interests, signing the 
Convention on September, 8, 1951.118 
The convention's purpose was “to regulate transit and navigation in the 
Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised 
under the general term Straits in such manner as to safeguard, within the 
framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian 
states, the principle enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at 
Lausanne on July 24, 1923.”119  
The Convention, which supersedes the 1923 Lausanne Convention, 
consists of 29 articles, four annexes and a protocol. 
The Convention is valid for a term of twenty years, until November 9, 1956  
(Article 28/1) subject to prior notification by the contracting parties to abolish it  
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(Article 28/3). So far the abolition process has not been initiated. The principle of 
freedom of transit and navigation in Article 1 of the Convention has an indefinite 
term (Article 28/2). 
Freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits is regulated in the 
Convention based on discrimination among merchant vessels, vessels of war, 
and aircraft.  Other distinctions are dependent on circumstances: times of peace, 
when Turkey is not belligerent in time of war, when Turkey is belligerent in time 
of war, and situations when Turkey considers itself threatened with imminent 
danger of war. 
Consideration of “situation[s] which Turkey considers itself to be 
threatened with imminent danger of war” is a new regulation not covered in the 
Lausanne Straits Convention. It allows Turkey to act for preventive self defense.  
Table 2 shows which articles regulate passage by type of ship and circumstance. 
 
In Time of War 
 
In Time of 
Peace Turkey is not 
a belligerent 







danger of war 
Merchant 
Vessels 
2, 3 4 5 6 
Vessels of 
War 
10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 
18 
19 20 21 
Aircraft 23 
Table 2.   Discrimination of the Montreux Convention Articles 
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B. MERCHANT VESSELS 
No clear definition is given for merchant vessels in the Montreux 
Convention. Article 7 considers all ships not covered by Section II (Articles 8-22) 
as “vessels of war” to be merchant vessels, including state ships when used for 
commercial purposes. 
1. In Time of Peace 
In peacetime, merchant vessels benefit from complete freedom of transit 
and navigation in the Straits day and night without regard to their flags and the 
loads they carry and without being subject to any procedure except for medical 
inspections regulated by Turkish laws pursuant to international health rules. Each 
ship which enters the Straits from Aegean or Black Sea must stop at a health 
station close to the Straits entry. An inspection is conducted. Ships with a clear 
medical certificate or a medical statement confirming that there is no contagious 
and epidemic disease in the ship are not stopped other than during their passage 
from the Straits. 
While in transit without stopping at any harbor of the Straits, ships do not 
pay tax or charges other than taxes and charges authorized in Appendix I to the 
Convention (Articles 2/1, 3/1). Taxes and charges provided in Appendix I are 
based on “Francs gold.” Taxes or charges collected in consideration of services 
are calculated over registered net tonnage of the ship. 
Pilotage (guidance) and towage are optional. If an agency of the merchant 
vessels or the captain demand these services, and they are furnished by Turkish 
authorities, charges are collected; the amounts are published periodically by the 
Turkish government (Appendix I Article 5). 
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2. In Time of War, Turkey not being Belligerent 
As per Article 4, if Turkey is not a belligerent in a war, merchant vessels 
benefit from the freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits under the 
conditions provided for in time of peace without regard to their flags and loads. 
Pilotage and towage are optional. 
3. In Time of War, Turkey being Belligerent 
If Turkey is a belligerent in a war, merchant vessels which belong to a 
state at war with Turkey may not pass through the Straits. Merchant vessels 
pertaining to non-party states have freedom of transit and navigation in the straits 
provided that they not assist in any way any state (enemy) at war with Turkey. 
Both this condition and the rights of Turkey arising from law of war as a 
belligerent state give Turkey the right to control loads carried by passing ships 
and to capture and seize contraband commodities. In such cases, ships must 
enter the straits during daytime and transit by the route determined by Turkish 
authorities (Article 5). 
4. Situation in which Turkey Considers Itself Threatened with 
Imminent Danger of War 
If Turkey considers itself facing imminent war, merchant vessels may pass 
through the Straits as in peacetime, but ships must enter the straits in daytime 
and follow the routes specified by Turkish authorities. Pilotage may be made 
obligatory but are subject to charge (Article 6).  
C. VESSELS OF WAR 
Provisions of the Convention applicable to vessels of war (Articles 9-22) 
must be examined in light of definitions in Appendix II for determining ships’ 
tonnages, classes and characteristics (Article 8).  
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1. In Time of Peace 
The safety of Turkey and the states on the Black Sea coast allows for 
some limitations on passage through the Straits and foreign naval forces in the 
Black Sea. 
a. Limitation Regarding Passage through the Turkish 
Straits 
The Convention does not grant every class of “vessels of war” the 
right of passage. Article 10 says that light surface vessels, minor war vessels and 
auxiliary vessels have freedom of transit without tax and charge whether or not 
they are connected to states on the Black Sea coast and irrespective of their 
flags if they enter the Straits in peacetime. 
Vessels of war may enter the Straits in daytime. During passage, 
commander of the naval force is obligated to notify a signal station at the 
entrances of the Canakkale and Istanbul Straits of the full composition of the 
force under his command without being obliged to stop (Articles 10, 13). 
Vessels of war passing through the straits must not use any aircraft 
they may carry (Article 15). 
To pass through the Straits in times of peace, vessels of war must 
give prior notification to the Turkish government through the diplomatic channel. 
The normal term for prior notification is eight days, which may be increased to 
fifteen days for states not on the Black Sea coast. The prior notification should 
specify the ships’ destination, name, type, number and passage dates for coming 
and going. Each date change is subject to advance notification of three days. 
The Straits must be entered within a period of five days from the date which is 
specified in the advance notification, or new advance notice must be given, 
subject to the same conditions (Article 13). 
Tonnages and numbers of vessels of war are also limited in 
accordance with Article 14, which specifies,  
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maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may 
be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 
tons, and these forces will not include more than nine ships. ... 
Vessels, visiting a harbor in the Straits and vessels of war which 
have been damaged during passage shall not be included in this 
tonnage.   
Article 14 also specifies that during repair, damaged vessels are 
subject to special safety provisions published by Turkey. 
The conditions and limitations related to tonnage and the class of 
ships do not apply to the transit of vessels of war of the states on the coast of the 
Black Sea. States on the coast of the Black Sea may pass through the Straits by 
their vessels of war with higher tonnage as long as they are accompanied by no 
more than two destroyers (Articles 10, 11). Vessels of war are defined in 
Appendix II to the Convention. 
States on the coast of the Black Sea have a right to move 
submarines they have produced or purchased abroad from the Straits to their 
naval bases after timely notification of Turkey. The states have a right to move 
their submarines from the Straits for dockyard repairs, also with timely notice to  
Turkey. Submarines must sail afloat and during daytime, and move through the 
Straits alone (Article 12). 
Naval forces of any tonnage or composition may make courtesy 
visits to a harbor in the Straits for a limited time to call upon the Turkish 
government (Article 17). 
b. Limitation in Respect of the Black Sea 
As per Article 10 of the Convention, only light surface vessels, 
minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels of the states which are not on the coast 
of the Black Sea may pass through the Straits to the north and sail to the Black 




aircraft carriers, may pass to the Black Sea. Article 18 of the Convention also 
imposes some limitations in terms of tonnage and time other than these general 
limitations. 
(1) Aggregate Tonnage: Total tonnage for vessels of 
states not on the coast of the Black Sea in the period of peace must not exceed 
30,000 tons (Article 18/1.a). However, if at any time, the tonnage of the strongest 
navy of the Black Sea exceeds the strongest navy’s tonnage in this sea as of 
signing date of the Convention, the maximum tonnage of 30,000 tons will 
increase to a maximum of 45,000 tons (Article 18/1.b). The USSR had a navy of 
60,000 tons in November, 1936, the effective date of the Convention.120 In 
January 1992, at about the time of its dissolution, the former Soviet Union had a 
105,000 ton navy in the Black Sea.121  Because of the increase from 60,000 to 
105,000 tons, the current aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea is 45,000 tons, 
compared to the 30,000 tons when the Convention was signed. 
Tonnage which may be on the sea by any state which is not 
on the coast of the Black Sea is limited to two-thirds of total tonnage (Article 
18/1.c). States on the coast of the Black Sea must communicate the tonnage of 
their navy at the Black Sea to the Turkish government on the first days of 
January and July every year. The Turkish government will deliver the information 
to the contracting parties (Article 18/1.b). 
The Convention provides an exception for the tonnage 
limitation. States which are not on the coast of the Black Sea may send a naval 
force not exceeding total 8,000 tons for humanitarian purposes without advance 
notification.  If the currently valid total tonnage of 45,000 tons is not met, the 
Turkish government must permit passage of the humanitarian vessels. 
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If the total tonnage is exceeded due to passages or this 
tonnage would be exceeded by the forces proposed to be sent, Turkish 
government will promptly inform the states on the coast of the Black Sea about 
the permission request. If these states do not object within 24 hours, the Turkish 
government will advise the states concerned of its decision within 48 hours. Each 
passage to the Black Sea of naval forces of the noncoastal states will be made 
within the limits of total available tonnage (45,000 tons) (Article 18/1.d). 
(2) Duration of Stay for the Vessels of War belonging to 
non-Black Sea Powers: Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea powers may 
not stay on the Black Sea more than 21 days (Article 18/2). 
The Turkish government is obligated to collect statistics 
about passage through the Straits and the Black Sea, provide necessary 
information, and supervise execution of each provision regarding passage of 
vessels of war from the Straits. 
The Montreux Convention is based on concern for the 
security of Turkey and states on the coast of the Black Sea. Therefore, when 
Turkey, the only supervisor of the provisions regarding passage through the 
Straits and the Black Sea, is given advance notification above specified amounts, 
Turkey has a right to respond in accordance with provisions of the Convention. It 
may never implement a special application under conditions other than those 
provided for by the Convention. 
2. In Time of War, Turkey not being Belligerent 
If Turkey is not a belligerent in a period of war, war ships of non-
belligerent states have freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits under the 
conditions provided for the period of peace (Article 19/1).  
Passage of warships of any belligerent state through the Straits is 
prohibited. However, warships of any belligerent state that have already left their 
bases and harbors at the beginning of the war have a right to pass through the 
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Straits to return to their harbors (Article 19/2, 4). These vessels are prohibited 
from exercising capture and seizure rights granted to the belligerent states by the 
law of sea warfare and inspection rights, and from performing other hostile acts 
in passage (Article 19/5). 
The Montreux Convention provides two exceptions to the rule of closing 
the straits to belligerent states' vessels of war. 
a. Fulfillment of Rights and Obligations Arising from the 
Covenant of the League of Nations 
The Convention allowed warships participating in a joint act under  
League of Nations authorization to traverse the Straits (Article 19/2, 25). Since 
the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and had no subrogation with the 
United Nations, this provision could not be applied.  
However, all states party to the Montreux Convention are also party 
to the United Nations Charter. Under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, UN 
members assume responsibility for assisting in measures agreed by the Security 
Council under the applications (Article 39-51) in Part VII of the Charter, “Action 
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of 
Aggression.”122 Therefore, war ships of a belligerent state may pass through the 
Straits to perform compulsory measures undertaken by the Security Council. This 
is an exception to the principle of keeping the Straits closed to warships of the 
belligerent states.123 In addition, the UN Charter specifies that responsibilities 
under the UN Charter prevail over responsibilities arising from any other 
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in the Montreux Convention, warships of UN member states would be allowed to 
pass through the straits in order to perform compulsory measures undertaken by 
the UN Security Council.124 
b. Passage by Warships of any Combatant State which is a 
Party to Mutual Assistance Covenant Binding Turkey 
As per a mutual assistance covenant binding Turkey concluded 
within the framework of a Pact of the League of Nations and registered with the 
Secretariat and published as per provisions of Article 18 of the Pact, the 
Convention provided passage through straits by warships of any belligerent  
state which is a party to the mutual assistance covenant in order to assist a state 
which is attacked (Article 17/2). As noted above, since the League of Nations 
expired legally and Turkey was not party to such a covenant during the period of 
the League, it is not possible to apply this exception today.  
3. In Time of War, Turkey being Belligerent 
In time of war, if Turkey is a belligerent, the Turkish government may act 
freely regarding passage of vessels of war (Article 20). In other words, in wars in 
which Turkey is a belligerent, decision about passage through the Straits by 
vessels of war pertaining to foreign states is left to the discretion of the Turkish 
government. 
In the event Turkey is a belligerent, the procedure provided for vessels of 
war in respect to the Black Sea (Article 18) do not apply, nor do provisions of the 
Convention regulating passage through the Straits by vessels of war in the period 
of peace (Article 8-17). 
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4. Situation in which Turkey Considers Itself Threatened with 
Imminent Danger of War 
If Turkey sees itself under an imminent threat of war, the procedure 
provided for a period of war in which Turkey is belligerent applies (Article 21/1). 
Vessels of war that have left their current bases and harbors are permitted to 
return to their bases and harbors before the application by Turkey of this 
authority granted by the Convention. 
However, Turkey has a right to prevent vessels of war of the state which 
expose Turkey to the imminent threat of war from benefiting from this right 
(Article 21/2). In other words, Turkey has a discretionary right to forbid vessels of 
war of the states that put Turkey in imminent danger from passing through the 
Straits to return their bases and harbors. Under such circumstances, Turkey is 
obliged under the Convention to inform high contracting parties and Secretary-
General of the League of Nations (Article 21/3). If the Council of the League of 
Nations decided by a two-thirds majority that Turkey's actions were fair and a 
majority of parties to the Convention agree, the Turkish government is obligated 
to desist (Article 21/4).  
The League of Nations has no practical value in terms of current 
international relationships. The United Nations was established in lieu of the 
League of Nations but independent of it. The UN is not a continuance of the 
League of Nations, and there is no functional link between them. However, the 
UN assumed the assets, archives, buildings and nonpolitical technical functions 
of the League of Nations. 
It is generally accepted that political functions given to the League of 
Nations to be performed via various covenants and agreements (in this context, 
applicable provisions of Article 21 of the Montreux Convention) may be assumed 
by the UN—not automatically, but upon request, following relevant resolutions 
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made by the General Assembly or the body concerned.125 In short, paragraphs 3 
and 4 of Article 21 of the Montreux Convention have practical application today. 
This does not mean that Turkey has unlimited discretionary power in this regard. 
Turkey's manner of exercising its discretionary rights may be discussed by other 
contracting states in accordance with normal international procedures.126 
D. AIRCRAFT 
Article 23 of the Convention regulates aircraft. Civil aircraft are permitted 
to pass over the Straits between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The Turkish 
government indicates the air routes allocated for passage and specifies forbidden 
zones of the straits. Civilian aircraft may pass, giving the Turkish government 
three days prior notification for non-scheduled flights and a general prior 
notification specifying passage dates for scheduled flights. The Turkish 
government provides facilities necessary for safe passage of civilian aircraft 
permitted to fly from the airspace between Europe and Asia as per its national 
legislation. 
Unlike the Lausanne Convention, the Montreux Convention does not 
accept  the principle of freedom of air transit  and regulates only transit by civil 
aircraft over the Straits. In other words, authorization for military aircraft to fly 
over the Straits is left to the government of the Republic of Turkey. 
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE TURKISH 
STRAITS AFTER THE SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 
A. THE SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 
The Turkish Straits attracted attention after the South Ossetia War.  In 
August 2008, tension in the Caucasus escalated again. After a long conflict, 
Georgian troops attacked separatist forces in South Ossetia. Russia was quick to 
respond to Tblisi's military operation against the separatist South Ossetia region. 
After more than a week of hostilities, the two sides signed a French-brokered 
peace agreement.127 
At the same time, military ships from the Spanish, German, Polish and 
U.S. navies sailed through the Straits as part of a NATO exercise, consistent with 
notification to Turkey under the Montreux Convention. Also, U.S. warships 
attempted to enter the Black Sea to provide humanitarian aid to Georgia.128 This 
time, the tension between Russia and the United States greatly escalated. 
Tensions in the region had inevitable consequences for Turkey. Caught 
between Russia, a neighbor and major economic partner, and the U.S., a 
superpower and traditional ally, Turkey faced with “major war risk.”129 
B. THE AFTERMATH OF THE SOUTH OSSETIA WAR AND THE 
CURRENT SITUATION 
After the South Ossetia War, the United States began communicating with 
Turkey to arrange passage of humanitarian aid to Georgia.130 Pentagon 
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spokesman Bryan Whitman reported, “The State Department is working at the 
necessary agreements to achieve some passage in the Straits of Turkey and 
things like that" and "Surface vessels give us the capability to provide larger 
amounts of relief supplies and they also give you the platform to operate off 
aerial assets, vertical lifts, those types of things.” 131 
Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
said that the United States planned to send two hospital ships, the USNS Mercy 
and the USNS Comfort, to Georgia for humanitarian aid. According to official 
U.S. data, the combined tonnage of the two ships exceeded 69,000 tons, making 
them ineligible for passage to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Russia said, “the United 
States demand to use the Straits to send two hospital ships carrying aid to 
Georgia is an apparent move that would violate the Montreux Convention.”132 
As noted above, the Montreux Convention specifies that the number of 
naval ships from states other than those on the Black Sea coast cannot exceed 
nine at any given time. In addition, the total displacement of the military ships 
cannot exceed 45,000 tons. Turkey denied passage through the Black Sea to the 
two ships, saying, “[R]equests for naval transport of such materials will be 
evaluated under the Montreux Convention's provisions.”  
These decisions gave the impression in the United States that “Turkey 
was not helpful.”133 For instance, Congressman Mark Kirk, Illinois Republican 
member of the House Appropriations Committee's Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee and a Navy reserve officer, said,  
As hundreds of Georgian civilians cry out for international 
assistance, Turkey is dragging its feet on approving the transit of 
U.S. hospital ships through the Turkish Straits. Blocking 
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humanitarian and medical supplies from reaching the people of 
Georgia is unacceptable. We should expect more from a NATO ally 
like Turkey.134 
Ariel Cohen, a Russian expert at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative 
American think tank, also criticized Turkey:   
Turkey is our NATO ally and, as a friend of Georgia, in my view, 
should have been more supportive of their Georgian neighbors and 
of their American allies, and this brings back the bad taste of 
Turkey, for example, barring American troops from going into Iraq 
through Turkish ports and Turkish territory in 2003—a step that 
vastly damaged the Turkish- American relations. I'd hoped we were 
putting that behind us. 135  
In the end, Turkey did not allow passage of the two U.S. naval vessels in 
excess of the weight limit defined in the Convention, instead allowing three lighter 
warships to pass through the Straits. 
Meanwhile, Russia said that the U.S. ships should remain in the Black 
Sea for only 21 days in accordance with the Montreux Convention, and warned 
that Turkey would be responsible if the ships did not leave within the specified 
time.136 
Russia's deputy military chief Anatoly Nogovitsyn said,  
[T]he NATO warships' entrance to the Black Sea is a serious threat 
to our security. Under the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936 on 
the status of the Turkish Straits, the warships can only stay in the 
Black Sea for 21 days. If the NATO ships continue to stay in the 
Black Sea after the expiration of 21-day period, then I would like to 
remind you that Turkey would be responsible. The U.S. ships are 
carrying nuclear missiles that can hit Russian targets as far away 
as St. Petersburg.137  
                                            
134 Enginsoy. 
135 Enginsoy. 
136 “Russia warns Turkey on U.S. ships in Black Sea,” Hurriyet News, September 5, 2008, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9766567.asp?gid=244&sz=39418 accessed December 
2008. 
137 "Russia warns Turkey on U.S. ships in Black Sea.” 
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Russia currently wants full compliance with the Montreux Convention. 
Vladimir Ivanovsky, the ambassador to Ankara, said,  
Russia and Turkey have one hundred percent the same approach 
on the Montreux Convention. We believe that this agreement 
complies with the needs of the today's world. Both countries 
support the full implementation of the Montreux Convention.138 
Similarly, at a press conference in Ankara, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen said, “The U.S. warships delivering 
humanitarian aid for Georgia have abided by the 1936 Montreux Convention.” He 
noted that the U.S. has not demanded a change in the convention. 139 
The South Ossetia War proves that the Turkish Straits remain militarily 
and strategically of vital importance. This unexpected war demonstrates how the 
Montreux Convention achieves balance in the Black Sea region. For instance, 
during the South Ossetia War, if more NATO or U.S. warships, aircraft carriers or 
submarines had entered the Black Sea, it might have caused a conflict or even a 
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V. POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR MODIFYING THE MONTREUX 
CONVENTION 
A. CHANGES LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 
TURKISH STRAITS 
Procedures for abolishing the Convention are specified in Article 28. The 
term of the Convention was set as twenty years from the effective date of 
November, 9, 1936. However, this twenty year term does not mean that the 
Convention would be abolished automatically after this term. The Montreux 
Convention stays in force unless it is abolished. Any contracting state could have 
given prior notice to abolish the Convention two years before the end of the 
twenty-year term. Although abolishing or renewing the Convention was 
discussed frequently by the U.S., England and the USSR during and immediately 
after World War II, the Convention was not abolished at the end of its effective 
term. 
The Convention may also be abolished two years after any state desiring 
to exercise this right delivers a “notice of denunciation” to the French 
government, the consignatory state. If any contracting state initiates this process, 
the Convention remains in force for two years; it will be deemed abolished after 
that time. The French government is responsible for advising the contracting 
states if it receives such notice.  
If the Convention is abolished, the contracting states agree to participate 
in a conference to determine provisions of a new Convention. A new convention 
may be concluded as a result of such a conference or the conference may be 
completed without producing a convention. 
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B. REPLACING THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WITH A NEW 
AGREEMENT 
If a new convention is convened to identify the regime for passage through 
the Turkish Straits, the principle of free transit and navigation will be operative. It 
is likely that the attitude of the U.S. would hold sway at any such conference. The 
U.S. is known to oppose all limitations on surface, underwater and air passage 
for international transport in the Turkish Straits. The U.S. is not likely to adopt a 
solution in conflict with its own argument in such a conference. 140 
In the Montreux Convention, the international transport passage regime 
through the Straits is “harmless passage.” The regime provided by UNCLOS for 
such straits (those not regulated by a special convention) is “transit passage.” 
Compared with the "harmless passage" regime, "transit passage" is more 
flexible. It restricts the powers of riparian states and prioritizes the interests of 
international sea transportation, namely the principles of freedom and 
consistency. 141 
Even if the U.S. was not represented at a conference held immediately 
after the abolition of the Convention, new NATO members Romania and 
Bulgaria, and NATO candidate members Ukraine and Georgia, would support the 
arguments of the U.S. Their views might conflict with the interests of Russia 
regarding the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey would request some 
limitations on passage through the Straits, especially by commercial ships 
carrying hazardous cargo, as well as new regulations to grant Turkey larger 
authorities in the Convention. In this case, the interests of Turkey and Russia 
differ greatly. 
                                            
140 Sevin Toluner, Boğazlardan Geçiş Güvenliği ve Montreux Sözleşmesi (Safety for 
Passage from the Straits and the Montreux Convention) (Istanbul: Istanbul University Press, 
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141 Sevin Toluner, Boğazlardan Geçiş ve Türkiye’nin Yetkileri (Passage from the Straits and 
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At this point, it is necessary to specify the concerns of Turkey as outlined 
by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 142 Since the signing of the Montreux 
Convention, the number of vessels passing through the Straits has increased by 
a factor of eleven, while total tonnage has increased more than 25 times. The 
number of ships passing through the Straits increased from 4,500 in 1938 to 






Table 3.   Vessel Traffic in the Turkish Straits143 
In recent years, the size of vessels and the nature of cargoes have also 
changed drastically. The ratio of oil, oil products and other dangerous and 
hazardous materials transported by large tankers is rapidly increasing. The 
                                            
142 “The Turkish Straits,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Web site, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-turkish-straits.en.mfa accessed December 2008. 
143 Turkish Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs Official Website, at 
http://www.denizcilik.gov.tr/tr/istatistik/istatistik.asp accessed March 2009. 










1995 46,954 129 35,460 97 
1996 49,952 137 35,487 97 
1997 50,942 140 36,543 100 
1998 49,304 135 38,777 106 
1999 47,906 131 40,582 111 
2000 48,079 132 41,561 114 
2001 42,637 117 39,249 108 
2002 47,283 130 42,669 117 
2003 46,939 129 42,648 117 
2004 54,564 149 48,421 133 
2005 54,794 150 49,077 134 
2006 54,880 150 48,915 134 
2007 56,606 155 49,913 137 
2008 54,396 149 48,978 134 
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number of oil tankers and other dangerous cargo vessels passing through the 
Strait of Istanbul rose by 90 percent between 1996 and 2007, from 4,248 to 
10,054. Similarly, the amount of hazardous cargo increased from 60.1 million 
tons in 1996 to 143.9 million tons in 2007, an increase of 130 percent. 
 
The Istanbul Strait The Canakkale Strait 















1996 4,248 60,118,953 5,657 79,810,052 
1997 4,303 63,017,194 6,043 80,458,711 
1998 5,142 68,573,523 6,546 81,974,831 
1999 5,504 81,505,453 7,266 95,932,049 
2000 6,093 91,045,040 7,529 102,570,322 
2001 6,516 101,000,000 7,064 109,000,000 
2002 7,427 122,953,338 7,627 130,866,598 
2003 8,097 134,603,741 8,114 145,154,920 
2004 9,399 143,448,164 9,016 155,561,833 
2005 10,027 143,565,196 8,813 148,951,326 
2006 10,153 143,452,401 9,567 152,725,702 
2007 10,054 143,939,432 9,271 149,320,062 
2008 9,303 140,357,231 8,758 149,052,174 
Table 4.   Tanker Traffic in the Turkish Straits144 
The vast growth in the number of vessels and the amount of hazardous 
cargo in recent years considerably increases the risk of maritime disasters in the 
Turkish Straits with possible grave consequences for the surrounding human and 





                                            
144 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
turkish-straits.en.mfa accessed March 2009. 
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MAIN SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 
MARITIME INCIDENT AND CASUALTY TABLE 
YEAR  INCIDENTS  DEAD INJURED LOST RECOVERED 
1999 126 18 18 21 170 
2000 117 46 31 19 16 
2001 131 25 5 22 570 
2002 93 21 2 13 523 
2003 115 15 4 7 173 
2004 151 22 4 32 1,586 
2005 147 24 - 17 405 
2006 116 8 - 12 124 
2007 117 18 3 - 245 
Total 1,113 197 67 143 3,912 
Table 5.   Maritime Incidents and Casualties in the Turkish Straits145 
Today, all countries including Russia know that the Turkish Straits can no 
longer manage this load. An environmental disaster in the Turkish Straits would 
irreparably harm Istanbul, a UNESCO World Heritage site. It is estimated that in 
Istanbul, with a population of thirteen million, nearly five million would die from an 
LPG tanker explosion. 
The Turkish Straits connecting the Black Sea to  the high seas serves as a 
vital passage for oil tankers. In 2006, the leaders of Russia, Bulgaria and Greece 
signed an agreement to build a one billion dollar pipeline to bypass the Turkish 
Straits and carry Russian and central Asian oil directly to the Mediterranean at 
the Greek port of Alexandroupolis. (Figure 2) Energy analysts say there is an 
economic reason why such a bypass has not yet been built, and no one is 
convinced the pipeline will ever be built.146    
 
                                            
145 Turkish Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs Official Website, at 
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Figure 2.   Planned Pipeline Route to Bypass the Turkish Straits147 
In an atmosphere in which interests conflict, agreement on a new 
convention appears impossible. Two main options might be at issue in a new 
convention. 
1. A new convention may include more restrictive provisions than the 
Montreux Convention, especially for war and merchant vessels of foreign 
countries. 
2. A new convention may include more freedom for war and merchant 
vessels. 
Given current international conventions on the law of the sea, the first 
option is almost impossible. The chances of the second option are greater.  
C. ABOLITION OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WITHOUT 
CONCLUDING A NEW AGREEMENT 
In the event of the abolition of the Montreux Convention and a failure to 
conclude a new convention, there might be various initiatives to apply the “transit 
passage regime” described in the UNCLOS provisions for “The Straits Used in 
International Transport." However, if the Montreux Convention were abolished, 
the “principle of freedom of transit and navigation”  arising from common law and 
                                            
147 Source: Voice of America, 11 October 2007, at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-10/2007-10-11-voa22.cfm accessed March 2009. 
 57
Article 1 of the Convention would remain in force (Article 28/2). Furthermore, as 
noted by the International Court of Justice in a decision regarding the Corfu 
Strait, freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits has the nature of 
custom.148 
All ships, whether warships, state ships or merchant ships, benefit from 
this right. Consequently, if the convention disappears and no regulation is made, 
the "transit passage" regime would remain valid in the Turkish Straits region. The 
belief that Turkey would have authority to arrange passage through the Straits  
however it wanted if the Convention was abolished is based on an incorrect 
assumption. 
If the Convention expired without a new instrument, a dispute might occur 
over the issue of a strait that combines two open seas. The question of whether 
to agree to a regime of “harmless passage” or of “transit passage” would be 
discussed as well. If the existence of a strait that combines two open sea areas 
prevails, as defined in UNCLOS, and if the “transit passage” regime were 
adopted, a freer passage regime would be applied in the Turkish Straits. In such 
a case, Turkey should argue that passage through the Straits must be within the 
framework of a "harmless passage" regime. However, this argument might face  
serious opposition by those claiming that because the transit passage regime 
has become a common law rule and is generally recognized, it should be applied 
in the Turkish Straits region as well. 
The Marmara Sea is an internal sea, all coasts of which belong to Turkey. 
If the Istanbul and Canakkale Straits did not exist, the Marmara Sea would be a 
Turkish lake. In this case, the major question would be, Are the Turkish Straits a 
single strait connecting two open seas, or are they two separate straits 
                                            
148 Unlu, 18-19. In that case, court decision was as follows: “It may be asked whether the 
test is to be found in the volume of traffic passing through the strait or in its greater or lesser 
importance for international navigation. But, in the opinion of the Court, the decisive criterion is 
rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas. Nor can it be decisive 
that this strait is not a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, but only an alternative 
passage between the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas. It has nevertheless been a useful route for 
international maritime traffic.” 
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connecting an open sea and an internal sea?  Because the Turkish Straits are 
the only passage connecting the Black Sea to international waters, the first 
option would be dominant. Expecting the United States and Black Sea countries 
such as Russia to accept otherwise would be very optimistic. 
D. MODIFYING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION 
The method for amending one or more provisions of the Montreux 
Convention Regarding Turkish Straits is regulated in Article 29 of the Convention 
in detail. As per this article: 
1. Each of the contracting states may attempt to propose 
amendments to one or more provisions at the end of each period of five 
years starting from enforcement of the Convention. 
2. For the purpose of acceptance of amendment requests by 
the contracting states, if this request; 
 a. is related to the Article 14 which regulates maximum 
tonnage and number of foreign naval forces which are passing from the 
straits at the same time and to the Article 18 which regulates total tonnage 
which may be made available by the states which are not on the coast of 
the Black Sea and time for staying at this sea in the period of peace, then 
it must be supported by any other contracting state, 
 b. intends to amend other articles, then it must be 
supported by two contracting states. 
3. Amendment request, which is supported by one or two 
contracting states, will be advised to each of other contracting states at 
least three months before expiration of the current period of five years 
together with its nature and justification. 
4. In the event of failure in reaching a solution for amendment 
proposals by way of diplomacy, contracting states undertook to participate 
in a conference to be held to discuss the amendment request. 
5. Amendment of convention provisions in the conference is 
subject to unanimous decision of contracting states. However, if 
amendment request is in connection with Articles 14 and 18, a majority 
composed by three fourths of contracting states is sufficient for 
acceptance of the request. This majority is a special majority; three fourths 
of contracting states, which are on the coast of the Black Sea, including 
Turkey, must be included in the said majority of three fourths.  
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Thus, while there is deviation from the classical unanimity principle, 
Turkey has a “veto” right over amendments to Articles 14 and 18. A privileged 
status is created for the states on the coast of the Black Sea by the majority vote. 
When the Montreux Convention concluded, there were three contracting 
states on the coast of the Black Sea in addition to Turkey:  Bulgaria, Romania 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Affirmative votes by two, along with 
Turkey, is the required three-fourths majority. A negative vote by one was an 
obstacle to amending Articles 14 and 18. The number of states on the coast of 
the Black Sea today has reached six:  Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation and Georgia.  
 
Figure 3.   The Black Sea Countries149 
                                            
149 Source: Institute for Applied Science, at www.iapscience.com/img/Black_Sea_map.png 
accessed March 2009. 
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An affirmative vote of five contracting states, including Turkey, is required 
for the majority specified by the Convention. A negative vote from only one 
contracting state is not an obstacle to amending Articles 14 and 18. No 
amendment has yet been made to the Convention applying the procedure in 
Article 29. 
Amendments that might be made to the Montreux Convention by the 
method explained above include the following. 
1. General Composition of the Convention 
The Convention should continue to discriminate among merchant vessels, 
vessels of war and aircraft and discrimination among “in time of peace,” “in time 
of war," "Turkey not a belligerent,” “in time of war, Turkey as a belligerent,” and a 
“situation which Turkey considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war.” 
Such classifications help balance passage rights of warships and commercial 
ships and Turkey's sovereignty rights in extraordinary cases. 
As a requirement for respecting Turkish sovereignty, the following 
regulations might be made for peacetime without new regulations in wartime or 
when Turkey considers itself threatened. 
2. Merchant Vessels 
The Montreux Convention does not give a clear definition of commercial 
ships. This definition might be added, although it is not really necessary. 
However, a separate classification should be created for ships carrying 
dangerous loads such as petrol or LPG.  This would allow new regulations for 
commercial ships with dangerous loads. Prohibition of passage by such ships is 
not implied here; the point is to grant Turkey the authority to plan passage times 
for ships with dangerous cargo. 
Today, this case is already provided for by the Straits Regulation adopted 
by Turkey in 1982. Turkey sent the regulation it prepared to the parties and it was 
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generally accepted despite some objections. For example, according to the 
regulation, traffic is closed one way during passage by ships with heavy tonnage, 
and other ships wait in appropriate areas. However, application of this and similar 
articles is subject to ships' awareness of the regulation and depend upon 
goodwill. Inclusion of this regulation in the Convention text would not erode 
passage rights, but make simply make passage safer. 
It is important to remember that the narrowest point of the Istanbul Strait is 
700 meters and that ships in the strait make thirteen sharp maneuvers including 
some very sharp rotations of 85 degrees. 150 Passage of a 480-meter-long petrol-
bearing tanker is very dangerous, and tankers may well get larger. Therefore, it 
would be useful to have a size limitation for ships with dangerous loads. This 
would require persuasion, especially of Russia. 
Guidance and towage (in other words, backup) should not be optional, 
and should be compulsory at least for larger ships and those carrying dangerous 
loads. 
                                            
150 Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service (TSVTS) Official Webpage, at 
http://www.afcan.org/dossiers_techniques/tsvts_gb.html accessed March 2009. 
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with pilot % 
1995 46,954 17,772 37.8 35,459 8,292 23.4 
1996 49,952 20,317 40.6 36,198 10,307 28.4 
1997 50,942 19,752 38.7 36,543 11,047 30.2 
1998 49,304 18,881 38.3 38,777 11,448 29.5 
1999 47,906 18,424 38.4 40,582 10,002 24.6 
2000 48,078 19,209 39.9 41,561 11,130 26.7 
2001 42,637 17,767 41.6 39,249 10,703 27.3 
2002 47,283 19,905 42.1 42,669 12,164 28.5 
2003 46,939 21,175 45.1 42,648 13,020 20.5 
2004 54,564 22,318 40.9 48,021 14,404 29.7 
2005 54,794 24,449 45.0 49,077 15,661 32.0 
2006 
(9 months) 40,988 19,913 49.0 36,609 12,605 34.4 
Table 6.   Passages with Pilot through the Turkish Straits151 
3. Vessels of War 
a. Limitation Regarding Passage through the Turkish 
Straits 
The Turkish Straits pass near very large Turkish cities, including 
Istanbul. More than 30 percent of Turkey's population lives in this region. The 
biggest industrial zones and navy headquarters are also in the region. So 
practices accepted in the Montreux Convention and described in Chapter III, like 
daytime passage by warships, advance notice and rules to be followed during 
passage should be maintained for the safety of Turkey. Other articles might 
certainly be modified to reflect current conditions. 
Tonnages and numbers of warships are limited in accordance with 
Article 14, which specifies, “maximum total tonnage of all foreign naval forces ... 
                                            
151 Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service (TSVTS) Official Webpage, at 
http://www.afcan.org/dossiers_techniques/tsvts_gb.html accessed March 2009. 
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will not exceed 15,000 tons and these forces will not contain more than nine 
ships.” This article might be adjusted and the total tonnage amount increased to 
reflect current conditions and current warships. 
b. Limitation in Respect of the Black Sea 
As per Article 10 of the Convention, in peacetime states not on the 
Black Sea coast may pass only light surface ships, small warships and auxiliary 
ships north from the Straits to the Black Sea. Certain other classes of ships, like 
submarines and aircraft carriers, are not permitted to pass to the Black Sea. It 
would be appropriate to continue this policy as the Black Sea has been a safe 
sea for a long time. 
An exception might be provided for submarines, considering the 
increase in the number of NATO member countries. Given such an exception, 
NATO or U.S. submarines might pass into the Black Sea to participate in military 
exercises, provided they do not stay longer than a specified time and give prior 
notice to Turkey and the Black Sea countries. 
(1) Aggregate Tonnage: In practice, this figure is now 
45,000 tons. As with limitations on passage through the Straits, this figure might 
also be discussed and increased. 
(2) Duration of Stay for the Vessels of War belonging to 
non-Black Sea Powers: Warships of the non-coastal states may not stay in the 
Black Sea for more than 21 days, regardless of their reasons (Article 18/2). This 
article is meaningless in practice. For instance, U.S. warships in the Black Sea 
now exit the Straits for one day at the end of the 21-day term and reenter the 
following day. This just increases the traffic load. Along with changes to the total 
number and tonnages of foreign warships on the Black Sea, there would be no 
problem in deleting the article related to length of stay. 
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4. Articles Regarding the League of Nations 
All articles related to the League of Nations might be renewed, substituting 
the current United Nations and UN Security Council for the now-defunct League 
of Nations. If this were done, warships of states participating in joint actions for 
military or humanitarian assistance under a Security Council decision might pass 
through the Turkish Straits without limitation, even if they are ships from 
belligerent states. As Russia and the U.S. have Security Council veto power, 
neither would object to this provision. 
5. Aircraft 
No complaint has been delivered by any state about provisions in 
Montreux Convention regarding aircraft. Therefore, there is no need to amend 
these provisions.  The Turkish government will continue to provide air corridors 
allocated for passage and necessary facilities for civilian airplanes. Authority to 
permit or forbid military planes passage over the Straits should remain with the 




A. A GENERAL EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO THE 
MONTREUX CONVENTION 
Any of the amendments mentioned above would change the international 
balance in regard to the Black Sea. There would be winning and losing parties in 
each case. At present, the Black Sea has four main parties, including two global 
actors: Russia, the U.S., Turkey and the other Black Sea countries. This chapter 
presents the advantages and disadvantages to the four parties of possible 
amendments to the Montreux Convention. 
In general, the interests of Russia and the U.S. in regard to the the Black 
Sea are diametrically opposed, while the interests of the Black Sea countries 
overlap with U.S. interests. Turkey remains caught between Russia, a good 
neighbor with strong economic ties, and the United States, its traditional ally. 
Turkey's interests overlap with Russia's in some respects, and with U.S. interests 
in other respects. 
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR TURKEY 
The conclusion of a new convention would hardly be to Turkey's 
advantage. However, a new convention with increased sensitivity to the 
environment would calm anxieties in the Turkish Straits and create a safer 
passageway. Of course, Turkey cannot prevent passage of commercial ships 
even if they carry dangerous loads. However, recognition by the convention of 
the Straits Regulation adopted by Turkey in 1982 would benefit Turkey. In fact, 
this is Turkey's only desire in regard to the Straits today. 
If a new convention were to provide more freedom of passage for both 
warships and commercial ships, current problems will become more complex for 
Turkey.  
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The abolition of the Montreux Convention without the adoption of a new 
convention is the worst scenario for Turkey. In such a case, there would be no 
discrimination between warships and commercial ships. It is possible that a 
"transit passage" regime would be applied instead of the "harmless passage" 
regime currently applied. Nations not on the Black Sea coast, like the U.S., would 
likely push for this. The Turkish Straits could not manage the increased traffic. 
Free passage through the Straits, day and night, by commercial ships (some with 
dangerous loads) without limitation or regulation would increase the risk of 
accident and sea pollution in the Straits. Major environmental disasters would be 
inevitable. 
Most importantly, with removal of the limitations on warships, each 
passage from the Straits to the Black Sea by NATO or U.S. ships would increase 
tensions and lead to opposition between Turkey and Russia. Turkey would be 
obliged to allocate more military forces to the Black Sea. 
If the Montreux Convention remains in force with amendments to only 
certain articles, the "harmless passage" regime desired by Turkey would 
continue. If Turkey's requests in regard to commercial ships are met, risks of an 
environmental disaster would decrease. Increasing the numbers and staying time 
for warships on the Black Sea would not cause serious damage to Turkey. 
However, Turkey thinks that the Black Sea is now safe, and must not become 
more militarized. 
In fact, making specific modifications agreeable to everyone involved 
without changing the core of the Montreux Convention would be the best option.  
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The worst scenario for the U.S. would be concluding a new convention 
with more limitations, a scenario with a low probability. 
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In the event of a new convention which is more free than the Montreux 
Convention, U.S. would be able to have more military assets on the Black Sea 
but submarine and airplane carriers would still be forbidden from passing through 
the Black Sea. 
In case of termination of the Convention without a new convention, the 
U.S. would achieve its aim with the Black Sea. It is clear that, upon acceptance 
by Turkey of a "transit passage" regime, the U.S. would be able to have naval 
forces on the Black Sea without limitations on type, number, tonnage and time. 
This would allow the U.S. to develop relations with the new NATO members and 
especially the candidate countries. Above all, if there were another event like 
South Ossetia war, its deterrence effect on Russia would be greater and it would 
be more likely that the U.S. could provide both humanitarian and military 
assistance to allied nations. 
However, it must not be forgotten that increasing U.S. military assets on 
the Black Sea will always cause problems between Russia and U.S. and 
adversely affect their relationship.  
Amendments to certain articles (discussed below) is the most appropriate 
solution to the current situation, which disturbs the U.S., and full freedom, which 
would disturb Russia.  
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR RUSSIA 
Russia would likely request that limitations be imposed on foreign 
warships in a new convention. Otherwise, they would have to accept more 
American assets on the Black Sea, and Russian influence on currently alienated 
Black Sea countries and Russian dominance in the region would continue to 
decline. 
Lack of contravention to regulate the passage regime through the Turkish 
Straits would be disadvantageous for Russia as well as Turkey. This option is the 
worst scenario for Russia. Russia would not feel secure in the Black Sea and 
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would choose to increase its naval forces there. Its only advantage is that no 
limitations would remain on commercial ships, so Russia would be able to market 
Caspian basin petrol freely to the world in tankers of any type and size. 
If Turkey's request for regulation of commercial ships is achieved by 
amendments to specific articles, Russia would be most affected and would never 
accept the proposals because Russia would face great problems in marketing 
Caspian basin petrol. In addition, even if complete freedom for warships is not 
allowed, making some limitations flexible would also bother Russia. 
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR BLACK SEA 
COUNTRIES 
Two of the six Black Sea countries are NATO members and two of them 
are candidate countries. It is likely that nations like Bulgaria and Romania would 
act with the U.S. in concluding a new convention in exchange for certain types of 
American assistance. 
If a new convention were to relax existing limitations or terminate the 
Montreux Convention without adopting a new convention, these four countries 
would feel safer against Russia thanks to increased NATO and U.S. presence in 
the Black Sea. The possibility of a Russian force like that seen in the South 
Ossetia war would decrease. The process of integrating with the West and NATO 
by these four nations would accelerate. Furthermore, opportunities for these 
nations to engage in exercises and training on the Black Sea within the NATO 
structure would increase, and thus their naval forces would be better trained and 
modernized. 
Black Sea countries would be affected by specific limitations likely to be 
imposed on commercial ships consistent with Turkey’s requests, but not as much 
as Russia. Except for the limited carrying capacity of the Danube River, these 
nations' only route to open seas and oceans is through the Turkish Straits. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Although the Montreux Convention is technically out of date, particularly in 
regard to the need to update naval vessel classifications and to substitute the 
authority of the United Nations for the League of Nations, the political balance 
provided by the convention has served Turkish, Russian and Western interests. 
Today’s situation regarding the Turkish Straits has both economic and 
strategic aspects. Economically, there is little disagreement among Turkey and 
the riparian and non-riparian states. The idea that the Straits should be kept open 
to ships for commerce without restriction, in time of peace or in time of war, has 
undoubtedly achieved general acceptance. It has been accepted for the regime 
of the Straits for the last two centuries.  
The change in Turkey’s position results from many sea accidents involving 
commercial vessels with hazardous cargo, some of which have caused sea and 
air pollution and seriously threatened environmental safety. Accidents at 
Bosphorus, the route for tanker traffic, could result in serious consequences for 
the fifteen million people living in Istanbul and others throughout the region. The 
closure of Bosphorus due to an accident could negatively affect all states that 
rely on the Turkish Straits, and particularly the Black Sea countries.  
Article 2 of the Montreux Convention states, “Pilotage and towage remain 
optional.” In other words, pilotage is not compulsory. Analysis of the accidents in 
the Turkish Straits reveals that only 7.2 percent of ships involved in accidents 
were using a maritime pilot. 152 Accordingly, the author of this thesis concludes, 
first, that Turkey’s environmental concerns should be considered in discussions 
of the Turkish Straits and the Montreux Convention. 
On the strategic side, the Turkish Straits present a triangular configuration 
involving the strategic exigencies of Turkey, the Black Sea powers and the other 
                                            
152 Necmettin Akten, “The Montreux Convention and the Black Sea Geopolitics,” Eurasia 
Critic, at http://www.eurasiacritic.com/november/hk_montr_conv.html accessed March 2009. 
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powers.153 The Montreux Convention has balanced these three sets of interests 
for 73 years and it still seems the arrangement best suited to the requirements of 
today.154  
There are two reasons for this. According to the Montreux Convention, the 
Turkish Straits are open to warships of Black Sea countries in time of peace, but 
not to warships of other countries except for the aggregate tonnage allowed. This 
provides security to the Black Sea countries. When Turkey is neutral in wartime, 
passage of belligerents' warships is prohibited. This is the only way that Turkey 
can protect itself from involvement in a war. It is clear that allowing passage of 
warships belonging to belligerents would make the Straits a battlefield. 
Therefore, the second conclusion of this thesis is that the current system 
under the Montreux Convention is ideal for safeguarding the interests and 
strategic exigencies of all parties: Turkey, the Russian Federation, other Black 
Sea countries and the Western powers, including the United States. The 
experience of the South Ossetia War has proved this once again. 
To abolish the Convention now would require prior notification by the 
contracting parties (Article 28/3). Interestingly, despite many demands for 
modification since 1936, the abolition process has not been initiated. It seems 
that no one wants the Monteux Convention revised, at least officially. Hence, the 
third conclusion of this thesis, and the answer to the first part of the key research 
question, "Is modification of the Montreux Convention necessary?" is “No, 
modification of the Montreux Convention is not necessary.” 
 Nevertheless, it is clear that every side has demands regarding the 
passage regime for the Turkish Straits. Russia wants greater restrictions while 
the United States wants a greater naval presence in the Black Sea. As for 
Turkey, it wants the Straits to be more secure, both environmentally and 
militarily. Therefore, if some day modifications to the Montreux Convention 
                                            
153 Esmer, 301. 
154 Esmer, 302. 
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become necessary, the best option to satisfy all parties and maintain peace in 
the Black Sea region would be to make specific modifications to be agreed by all 
parties without changing the core of the Montreux Convention. 
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